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Case Comment
Lottery Winnings as Capital Gains
United States v. Maginnis, 356 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2004).
Pity J. Michael Maginnis. In 1991, he had the misfortune to win
$9 million in the lottery.' Five years later, he sold his remaining winnings-
fifteen annual payments of $450,000 each-to Woodbridge Financial
Corporation for a $3.95 million lump sum. He reported this payment on his
tax return as ordinary income, but he changed his mind several years later
and sought a refund of some $305,000, claiming that the lottery payment
was a capital gain.2 Strangely, the IRS agreed and refunded his money.
Then the IRS had its own change of heart-again several years later-and,
in 2001, sued Maginnis, claiming that the refund was erroneous. An Oregon
district court agreed with the Service,3 the Ninth Circuit affirmed,4 and poor
Maginnis had to return his refund.
There is little debate that this is the right result: Maginnis's attempt to
convert gambling income into capital gain was a fairly transparent ploy.
5
Nonetheless, Judge Fisher's opinion for the Ninth Circuit, which sets out a
two-factor test for whether a gain is ordinary income under the "substitute
for ordinary income" doctrine, is problematic. This Comment argues that an
alternative approach that analyzes the transaction by which Maginnis
1. The facts in this paragraph are drawn from United States v. Maginnis, 356 F.3d 1179,
1180-81 (9th Cir. 2004).
2. Capital gains are taxed at a significantly lower rate than ordinary income. Compare I.R.C.
§ 1(h)(1)(C) (2000) (capital gains), with id. § 1(a)-(d) (ordinary income).
3. United States v. Maginnis, No. CIV. 01-368-KI, 2002 WL 1482390 (D. Or. May 28, 2002).
4. Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1179.
5. Several other recent cases have so held. See Clopton v. Comm'r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1217 (2004);
Simpson v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1421 (2003); Johns v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1318 (2003);
Boehme v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1039 (2003); Davis v. Comm'r, 119 T.C. 1 (2002).
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received his lottery right may better explain and confine the use of the
notoriously murky "substitute for ordinary income" doctrine.
Part I of the Comment discusses the "substitute for ordinary income"
doctrine. Part II describes Maginnis's two-pronged test for applying the
doctrine and points out the economic and doctrinal difficulties with that
test. Part III proposes an alternate analysis that better achieves the policies
of the "substitute for ordinary income" doctrine.
I
The Ninth Circuit sided with the IRS on the basis of the "substitute for
ordinary income" doctrine, which holds that "'lump sum consideration
[that] seems essentially a substitute for what would otherwise be received at
a future time as ordinary income' may not be taxed as a capital gain."6 A
classic example is that of an employee who sells his rights to collect future
wages: He will receive ordinary income, not capital gain, because the
payment is a mere substitute for his right to receive ordinary income.
This doctrine is usually traced to two leading cases: Hort v.
Commissioner, which held that a payment to cancel a lease was ordinary
*8income, and Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., which held that the
assignment of a right to receive (some of) the proceeds of future sales of oil
also created ordinary income. 9 In both cases, the taxpayer attempted to
secure capital gains treatment by selling future rights to receive ordinary
income. If this were allowed, virtually no one would have to pay tax on
ordinary income; any such income could be packaged, assigned, and
transformed into capital gain.' 0 The "substitute for ordinary income"
doctrine sprung up to prevent this abuse.
The problem with the doctrine is that every capital asset is a substitute
for ordinary income; read literally, the doctrine would completely swallow
the concept of capital gains. A commercial building is worth only as much
as the present value of its future leases-but those lease payments are
ordinary income, while the building is a capital asset. The Fifth Circuit long
ago noted this absurdity, explaining that "[t]he only commercial value of
6. Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1182 (quoting Comm'r v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 265
(1958)) (alteration in original).
7. See 2 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GIFTS 47.1 (3d ed. 2000).
8. 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
9. 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
10. See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 17.03, at 368 (9th ed. 2002).
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any property is the present worth of future earnings or usefulness," and
quoting Lord Coke as asking, "[W]hat is land but the profits thereofr?."'
The doctrine thus has little explanatory power. Instead, it lends itself to
ad hoc decisionmaking: "[C]ourts must locate the boundary case by case, a
process that can yield few generalizations because there are so many
relevant but imponderable criteria."1 2 An overbroad "substitute for ordinary
income" doctrine, besides being analytically unsatisfactory, would create
the potential for the abuse of treating capital losses as ordinary. 3 The
difficulty, then, is finding a way to appropriately cabin the doctrine to prevent
abuses without allowing it to consume the entire notion of capital assets.
II
To limit the doctrine and avoid these difficulties, the Ninth Circuit in
Maginnis identified two factors that characterize an asset as capital: first,
that the taxpayer made "any underlying investment of capital" in exchange
for the asset and, second, that the sale "reflect[ed] an accretion in value
over cost to any underlying asset."' 4 While the court qualified these factors,
noting that "we do not hold that they will be dispositive in all cases," it
nonetheless found them "crucial" to its decision.1 5 At first glance, this test
might seem to bring some clarity to the extremely murky theory of
substitutes for ordinary income. But on closer examination, each prong of
the Ninth Circuit's test proves to be untenable.
The first prong of the Maginnis test requires that the taxpayer make an
"underlying investment in exchange for a right to future payments."' 6 This,
presumably, aims to distinguish capital assets, like stock, from noncapital
assets, like assignments of future wages. But such a test is both over- and
underinclusive.
11. United States v. Dresser Indus., 324 F.2d 56, 59 (5th Cir. 1963) (emphasis and internal
quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit in Maginnis was well aware of the problem,
explaining that
[m]any assets, including common stock, are typically valued on the basis of the present
value of their future income stream, so an approach that took the substitute for ordinary
income doctrine too far, and defined the term capital asset too narrowly, would hold that
no sale of an asset that produces revenue .. could be taxed as a capital gain.
Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1182.
12. Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1182 (internal quotation marks omitted). Bittker and Lokken
identify six types of transactions; of these, the most important are temporal divisions ("horizontal
carve-outs"), which generally produce ordinary income unless the owner of a temporal division
sells her entire estate. 2 BITrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, 1 47.9.5.
13. Cf Ark. Best Corp. v. Comm'r, 485 U.S. 212 (1988) (limiting exceptions to the capital-
asset definition and disallowing ordinary loss on sale of bank stock).
14. Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1183.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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First, this prong of the test does not explain the result in many standard
cases. The taxpayer in P.G. Lake does appear to have invested in the
underlying asset (a working interest in oil and gas leases), but the court
nonetheless decided the case under the "substitute for ordinary income"
doctrine.1 7 Even clearer is the hornbook example of common stock: If a
shareholder buys stock and then sells the right to future dividends, that sale
(prior to dividend tax reform) is ordinary income despite the underlying
investment.18 Thus, the test does not account for the doctrine.
Second, this prong would treat as ordinary several types of assets that
are clearly capital. If the test requires the taxpayer who sells the asset to
have made the underlying investment of capital, then any taxpayer who
inherits stock will be liable for ordinary income, rather than capital gain, if
she sells it. The same would apply to a taxpayer whose parents gave her a
plot of land. These are obviously wrong results; a capital asset does not
become noncapital simply because it is received without consideration.1 9
Perhaps, though, instead of meaning that the taxpayer must have
invested in the underlying asset, Judge Fisher meant only that someone
must have invested in it. Once money is invested, the asset becomes capital
and may then be sold, donated, or devised without a change in character.
This seems much more sensible. Such a test accurately distinguishes a share
of stock (which, once someone has bought it, can be bequeathed and remain
capital) from a worker's right to receive future wages (which, because she
has invested only labor and not capital, is not a capital asset).
But this reading of the first prong still doesn't work. Besides being
unsupported by case law or statute, the revised first prong can't explain
Maginnis itself. In this case, someone did invest capital in the underlying
asset: the State of Oregon. 20 The asset was transferred to Maginnis in a
gambling transaction, but it was not created out of thin air (or by labor).
Thus, if Maginnis really means only that some underlying investment of
capital is necessary to produce a capital asset, then it doesn't cover its
own facts.
17. Comm'rv. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 261-62, 265 (1958).
18. This was clearly the result prior to dividend tax reform. See, e.g., CHIRELSTEIN, supra
note 10, 17.03, at 367. Now that dividends are taxed like capital gains, see I.R.C. § l(h)(1 1)
(West 2004), it is less clear how courts would approach the dividend carve-out, though one
assumes it would be taxed at dividend rates.
19. This is subject to a substantial caveat, which is that the characterization of certain special
kinds of assets does depend on whether their basis is traceable to their creators. Thus, copyrights,
letters, and similar property are capital in the hands of buyers but ordinary in the hands of their
creators or those who receive them as gifts. I.R.C. § 122 1(a)(3) (2000). See generally Jeffrey C.
McCarthy, Federal Income Taxation of Fine Art, 2 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1983).
20. A state that owes a lottery prize either sets aside money or buys an annuity to fund it. See,
e.g., Boehme v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1039 (2003) (describing Colorado's annuity).
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The second prong of the Maginnis test, asking whether the sale
"reflect[s] an accretion in value over cost to any underlying asset,' '2' is
similarly unsatisfactory. It attempts to determine the character of a gain
from its amount. An asset with zero basis will create more gain, when sold,
than the same asset with a significant basis. This distinction should not,
however, affect the character of the gain. The facts of Maginnis itself
illustrate the problems that come from inferring the character of gain from
the amount of basis. The Ninth Circuit noted that "the amount a purchaser
such as Woodbridge might pay for the right might be subject to some
uncertainty, 22 but it did not fully appreciate the source of this uncertainty.
The uncertainty involves fluctuations that are exactly equivalent to those in
the value of, say, a municipal bond. 3 If Maginnis acquired such a bond
with negligible basis, then his gain upon selling it would be large-but it
would all be capital gain. The difference between sale price and basis
cannot be used to distinguish capital from ordinary gain.
III
The Maginnis test does not satisfactorily distinguish which substitutes
for ordinary income are actually taxed as ordinary income and which are
taxed as capital gains. But the result is right; what is needed is a way to
achieve this outcome without unnecessarily expanding the reach of the
"substitute for ordinary income" doctrine. One solution might be to focus
not on the abstract question of whether a lottery right is a capital asset
but on the transaction at issue: the receipt, as a gambling winning, of the
lottery right.
In a sense, Maginnis received $9 million2 4 in ordinary income as soon
as he won the lottery: He immediately gained the right to receive $9
million, taxable at ordinary rates as gambling winnings. Now, in theory, the
government could have taxed the entire amount as soon as Maginnis won
the lottery. The lottery right is a right to future payments, but so are stocks
and bonds, and if Maginnis won shares of stock in a lottery, he would be
liable for tax (at ordinary rates) on their full value immediately.25
21. Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1183.
22. Id. at 1184.
23. Maginnis had a right to a fixed series of payments from the State of Oregon-just like a
state bondholder. As interest rates go up, the value of the right declines, and vice versa. If
investors lose confidence in the state's ability to pay its debts, the right loses value.
24. In this Part, I ignore the issue of discounting to present value. Maginnis can be thought of
as winning either $9 million over twenty years or its present value now; I use "$9 million" as a
shorthand for "the discounted present value of $9 million of payments over twenty years."
25. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (as amended in 2003) (taxing compensation in the form of
property at its fair market value).
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This is the best explanation for why the lottery right was not a capital
asset when Maginnis sold it: not that the future income was ordinary, or that
he had not made any investment, but that he only avoided tax on receipt via
a kind of administrative grace. If he had been given an Oregon state bond
rather than a lottery right, he might in fact have been held liable for taxes on
the full amount as soon as he won (and any gain on a future sale of the bond
would be capital). But he avoided immediate tax on his gambling
winnings-and, therefore, when he eventually sold off those rights, it was
sensible to hold him responsible for the taxation that he had avoided.
So why do we not tax the lottery right (as a gambling winning) as soon
as Maginnis wins it? The answer may lie in an analogy to the realization
requirement. It is a basic principle of tax law that economic income should
not be taxed until it is "realized"-a policy, traceable at least to Eisner v.
Macomber,26 based on principles of liquidity and valuation. Appreciation in
an asset's value is not typically realized (and thus taxed) until the asset is
sold, because taxing appreciation as soon as it occurs would create
difficulties of annual valuation and might require holders to sell some
illiquid assets to pay tax on the appreciation. 7
But similar policy concerns can arise in taxing rights to future payment
upon receipt. Valuing a stock or bond on receipt is easy because it has a
market price, but valuing a fixed-income item like a lottery right or a lease
may involve difficulties in choosing a discount rate. Similarly, stocks and
bonds are often reasonably liquid, and a portion of one's holdings can be
sold to pay tax on them, while leases and lottery rights tend to exist in more
illiquid markets and are more likely to be indivisible.28
This analysis might be viewed as a (sufficient, but not necessary) test
for applying the "substitute for ordinary income" doctrine. Assets that are
fully realized upon receipt-stocks, bonds, land-are capital assets, while
assets that, for policy reasons of valuation and liquidity, are not realized
immediately-leases, lottery rights-are substitutes for ordinary income in
the hands of those who receive them in ordinary-income transactions (e.g.,
as gambling winnings).
A better view, however, might be that there is simply no such
doctrine-instead, the term "substitute for ordinary income" is applied to a
number of unrelated transactions that can be better explained in other ways.
Maginnis himself proposed that the doctrine should be confined to two
26. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
27. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 10, 5.02, at 75; MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H.
SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 144 (rev. 4th ed. 2002).
28. These differences are not inevitable and should not be overstated. Leases may be assigned
and bundled by financiers, and many stocks are illiquid and difficult to value. But as broad
classes, it does seem likely that some rights to future payments are easy to think of as presently
valuable instruments, while others are better conceived of as mere streams of future payments.
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clear cases of abuse: "carve-outs" of part of a taxpayer's interest in property
and rights to future income from personal services. 29 The first of these,
carve-outs, formed the basis for Hort and Lake; conceptually, one can say
that a carve-out of a capital asset is not a capital asset without using the
phrase "substitute for ordinary income. ' '30 The second, rights to future
income from personal services, seems arbitrary: Why should personal-
services income be its own special category?
Rather than classify personal services as a case of a substitute for
ordinary income, it makes more sense simply to note that the right to
payment for future personal services, like the lottery right, is not fully
taxable on receipt.31 Thus, whenever it does become fully taxable, it is
taxed as it would have been when received: as personal-service income, as
gambling winnings. In a sense, the theory here is of an "open transaction":
32
Because the initial receipt of the right was not "closed," i.e., realized and
taxed, when that right accrued, the transaction closed when the right was
sold, and the entire amount was taxable based on the character of the
original transaction (personal-service income, gambling winnings).
This approach has several benefits. It preserves parity between a winner
who sells his lottery right and one who chooses to receive a lump sum
payment from the state.33 It clarifies that a future holder of the right, such as
Woodbridge, may treat it as a capital asset.3 4 And it is easily generalized
29. See Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1185; Reply Brief for Appellant, Maginnis (No. 02-35664),
reprinted in Lottery Winners Argue Right to Payment Is Capital Asset, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug.
28, 2003, 2003 TNT 167-18 (LEXIS).
30. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 10, 1 17.03, at 369-70 ("The 'substitute' language [in Hort],
in the view of most commentators, was merely a shorthand way of asserting that carved-out
interests do not qualify as capital assets and do not absorb any portion of the taxpayer's property
basis."). Further discussion of the carve-out branch of the "substitute" doctrine is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
3 1. That is, if I enter into a five-year, $1 00,000-per-year employment contract, I am not taxed
on the entire $500,000 at the moment of the contract. Even deferred compensation for already
performed services is generally taxed when received, not when accrued. See Rev. Rul. 60-31,
1960-1 C.B. 174; see also CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 10, 11.01, at 270-73.
32. For the more common use of this term in tax law, see Arthur Fleischer, Jr. & William L.
Cary, The Taxation of Convertible Bonds and Stock, 74 HARV. L. REV. 473, 478 (1961).
33. This was a goal of the Maginnis court. See Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1184.
34. What makes it an ordinary asset in Maginnis's hands is how it was received, as untaxed
gambling winnings; if it is purchased on the open market, then it becomes a capital asset.
This approach could also theoretically allow someone in Maginnis's position to capture the
"gain over cost" that the court dismissed in the second prong of its opinion: If, when Maginnis
won the lottery, his right was worth $3 million, but, before he sold it, interest rates declined and
the right's value increased to $3.5 million, then he should have had $3 million in gambling
income and $0.5 million in capital gain. This parallels what would have happened if Maginnis had
won an Oregon state bond in the lottery. This is a satisfying result as a matter of tax theory, but I
suspect that a court would not actually endorse this approach. The Maginnis court itself was
unimpressed by the possibility of change in value to the lottery right. See supra text
accompanying note 22. And, in Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941), the Supreme Court
refused to make a similar distinction where a lease, ordinary when signed, was later purchased
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beyond lottery rights, to personal-service income and even leases. 35 Most
important, this approach provides a boundary--or, at least, a guidepost to
finding the boundary-to the "substitute for ordinary income" doctrine.
While defining that doctrine in its entirety is beyond the scope of this
Comment, confining it ought to be an important goal. This is partly because
of its economic indeterminacy: As long as the doctrine can be invoked for
nearly any asset, it will promote uncertainty, abuse, and transactional
complexity. But it is also because of the doctrine's uncertain foundation in
the Code: The text of § 1221, defining "capital asset," does not provide any
support for the doctrine, which is a pure judicial creation. The Supreme
Court's decision in Arkansas Best appears to stand for the proposition that
judicial creation of exceptions beyond those in § 1221 is disfavored.36
The Ninth Circuit's approach in Maginnis seems to set out a general
test for applying the "substitute for ordinary income" doctrine, encouraging
judicial expansion of that vague and economically indeterminate concept.
This Comment advocates an approach that narrows the "substitute for
ordinary income" doctrine considerably. It avoids reliance on conclusory
statements that an asset is a substitute for ordinary income, and suggests
reading that doctrine as merely a label for a collection of a few specific
cases-principally, carve-outs and assets not realized immediately-that
have historically presented an opportunity to abuse the capital-gains rate
differential. This approach focuses not on a vague characterization of
assets, but on a careful look at the tax and economic realities of the
transactions involved. It may not be feasible to abandon the "substitute for
ordinary income" doctrine wholesale, but we can take a step in the right
direction by focusing on real issues in specific cases rather than on general
statements of a doctrine with no basis in statutory text or economic reality.
-Matthew S. Levine
(technically, cancelled by a lump sum payment) after having increased in value due to changes in
economic circumstances.
35. When a landlord enters into a lease, the full value of the future payments is not taxable
immediately; if he sells or cancels the lease, however, he owes taxes at ordinary rates on the
income that he then receives. Leases can be considered as a carve-out, as they were in Hort. See
supra text accompanying note 30. There are good reasons for treating leases under the carve-out
prong of the "substitute" doctrine, rather than under the open-transaction prong, but the open-
transaction approach is, I think, also illuminating.
36. See Ark. Best Corp. v. Comm'r, 485 U.S. 212, 218 (1988) ("The body of § 1221
establishes a general definition of the term 'capital asset,' and the phrase 'does not include' takes
out of that broad definition only the classes of property that are specifically mentioned."); see also
Patrick E. Hobbs, The Scope of the Inventory Exclusion Under LR.C. § 1221(1), 26 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 289, 317 (1993); Jay A. Soled, The Sale of Donors' Eggs: A Case Study of Why Congress
Must Modify the Capital Asset Definition, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 919, 940 (1999). Maginnis
himself relied on Arkansas Best to argue that the "substitute for ordinary income" doctrine should
apply only in two types of cases. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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